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Abstract 
The dynamics of prices and volume are investigated in a market where agents disagree 
about the fundamental value of the asset. The distribution of beliefs is not taken to 
be common knowledge. The resulting infinite hierarchy of beliefs is solved by making 
the assumption that, prior to the first trading round, agents consider themselves to 
be average. Speculation is shown to generate substantial volatility and volume, bid 
and transaction price predictability, rich patterns of volume, and an inverse relationship 
between changes in transact.ion prices and the number of trading rounds without volume. 
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1 Introduction
It ha.s long been acknowledged that speculation may explain prices and volume in financial 
markets (see Keynes [1936]). Speculators trade because they expect to earn short-term 
capital gains, rather tha.11 on the basis of fundamental information about the long-term 
value of the asset. Harrison and Kreps [1978] defined speculation as follows: 
"An investor may buy the stoc/, now, so as lo sell it later for more than what 
he thinks it is act1lally worth. thereby reap1:ng capital gains." 
Tirole [1982], however, argued that speculation cannot occur in the standard analyt­
ical framework of asset pricing models, namely rational expectations.1 One way it may 
occur is if a.gents disagree. The disagreement has to be authentic. Unlike in Harsanyi's 
mutual consistency requirement (Harsanyi [1968]), or in Aumann 's impossibility of agree­
ing to disagree (Aumann [1976]), disagreement must not be the result of updating from a 
common prior using different information. For if it were, any trade for reasons other than 
insurance would be impossible because of the winner's curse (see Milgrom and Stokey 
[1982] or Morris [1990]). This is not to say that authentic disagreement is irrational. 
It merely reflects agents' fundamental differences in their assessment of uncertainty. As 
discussed in depth in Kurz [1992], there may still be disagreement even after a prolonged 
period of comprehensive learning. 
*(;roupe HEC) F-78351 Jouy-en-Josas (France), Phone +3:3.1.39.()7.94.10 
1 Ca.lifornia Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125 ( lJ .S.A. ) , Phone + 1.818.356.4028. The
paper benefited fro1n n1any conversations \Vit.h l\Iah1noud EJ-(;a.n1al on learning and disa.gree1nent, and 
fro1n co1nn1ents during sen1ina.rs at I-IEC, UniversitC des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and AFFI. 
1See Allen\ 1'1orris and Postle1vaite [1992] for an extension of Tirole's analysis. 
Despite the fact that disagreement and speculation have long been advanced as po­
tential explanations of prices and volume in financial markets, there have been very few 
attempts at exploring to what extent they do. The paucity of analyses should not come 
as a surprise. \"!hen agents disagree, the distribution of beliefs in the economy is of 
interest. If this distribution is not common knowledge (would it. be plausible to assume 
otherwise?), the computation of equilibria becomes intractable, because agents posit and 
update higher-order beliefs. 
A speculator buys the asset to resell it .  He knows that the resale price will depend on 
the belief of the buyer about the fundamental value of the asset (the buyer's first-order 
belief). Hence the speculator must have beliefs over the first-order beliefs of the others 
(i.e., second-order beliefs ) .  The buyer also is a speculator. Hence, the price at which 
she buys the asset will, in turn, depend on her own second-order beliefs. Hence the 
initial holder of the asset must have beliefs a.bout the second-order beliefs of the others, 
i.e., third-order beliefs. Iterating the argument, a possibly infinite hierarchy of beliefs
emerges. 
Keynes [1936] coined the term bea11ty contest when spelling out the beliefs hierarchy. 
In his words: 
" each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds pret­
tiest, b11t those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the othei· com­
petitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. 
It is not the case of choosing those which, to !:he best of one's j11dgement, are 
really the prettiest, nor even those the a·verage opinion genuinely thinks the 
prettiest. !:Ve have reached the lhi1·d degree where we devote 011r intelligences 
to anticipal:ing what average opinion e:i:7Jects the average opinion to be. And 
there are some I believe, who praclise the fo11rth, .fifth and higher degrees." 
Boge and Eisele [1979] and Mertens and Zarnir [1985] proved that an equilibrium 
exists in static games with infinite beliefs hierarchies. Recently, El-Gama! [1992] did so 
for a dynamic model without strategic interaction as well. Nevertheless, to the best of our 
knowledge, explicit solutions of such models have not been obtained yet. The existence 
proofs do not provide an algorithm with which to calculate particular equilibria. The 
goal of this paper is to characterize an explicit solution, in order to analyze prices and 
volume in financial markets when agents disagree. 
One way to obtain explicit solutions would be to arbitrarily cut the infinite regress 
of beliefs. Townsend [198:3] did this in a related context. Or one could assume, as in 
El-Gama.I [1992], tha.t agents think that beliefs agree from a certain order on. We take
an alter11ative, argual)ly i11ore nat11ral route� \vhicl1 does i10L i11volve a11 a.1)1)roxir.natior1 
argument. \"le assume that each agent a priori thinks that her beliefs are average. It 
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works as follows. Assume a.gent i bas first-order belief I'« A priori, he thinks that the 
first-order beliefs of the other a.gents a.re on average equal to jli. Hence, his second order 
belief is also µ; .  It is common knowledge tha.t all a.gents behave similarly. So a.gent i 
knows that the first and second order beliefs of the agent j are equal to µj. Now, a 
priori, i expects jlj to be 11;. Consequently, the third-order belief of i is also equal to µ;. 
Iterating, this argument provides a solution to the infinite hierarchy of beliefs. 
In order to a.void problems of strategic behavior (manipulation of .beliefs),,a.nd to be 
able to concentrate on the impact of disagreement on prices and volume, we set up our 
model as follows. Borrowing ideas from the pairwise meetings literature (see Wolinsky 
[1990]), we assume that, ea.ch trading round, the holder of the single unit of the asset 
meets in the marketplace a person drawn at random from the population. The holder 
offers to sell this unit through an unspecified mechanism that induces the bidder to reveal 
truthfully his reservation value. The holder then decides to hand over the asset, or to 
keep it. VVhoever holds the asset at the end moves on to the next trading round. The 
other agent leaves the market. After a certain number of rounds, trading halts and the 
asset pays its dividend to the holder. Reflecting the fact that in financial markets the 
past history of trades can be traced , we assume that every a.gent, including present and 
future entrants, updates her beliefs from the initial trading round on, i. e. , using the 
complete history of trades and prices. 
There are basica.lly three dimensions in which speculation enriches asset pricing the­
ory. First, it adds a resale option to the privileges of ownership. Agents now value an 
asset not only for its dividend, but also for the option to resell it to a future buyer who 
values the asset more highly. Second, it introduces learning about the distribution of 
beliefs. The learning process generates price movements even when no news about the 
asset's fundamental value flows to the market . Third, it imports beliefs hierarchies into 
models of financial markets. The possibility of disagreement at higher levels of beliefs 
generates trading patterns that cannot be obtained in models with a simple resale option, 
even if agents have to learn about its value. 
In order to distinguish the contribution of each of these facets to explaining the 
behavior of prices and volume in financial markets. we consider three different cases. In 
the first (benchmark) case, the distribution of beliefs is common knowledge. In the two 
other cases, it is uncertain. The agents have different priors about it .  They rationally 
use the information available in the market and apply Bayes' rule to learn a.bout it .  In 
the second case, in order to focus exclusively on learning, we specify the model such 
that all higher-order beliefs agree after just one observation. In the la.st case, a.gents have 
different posteriors even after observing each other's beliefs. In that version of the model, 
higher-order beliefs agree only asyrnptotica.liy. 
edge. In fact , in this case, an outside observer. unaware of the absence of fundamental 
information flows, could erroneously conclude that prices behave as in a standard ra· 
tional expectations asset pricing model. For instance, the best offer in the market is a 
martingale, and volume cannot be used to predict subsequent price changes. 
In the second case, where the agents must learn about the distribution of beliefs, 
this observational equivalence disappears (even asymptotically, see Bossaerts [1992]). In 
our model, volume can be used to predict prices and, from the point of view of the 
econometrician, who would be able to determ.ine the true distribution pf beliefs .in the 
economy, the best offers are no longer a martingale. Yet, just like in a model where 
higher-order beliefs agree and are correct, its predictions concerning trading patterns are 
thin: the holder will always be the agent with the highest first-order belief, and trading 
dies out as the horizon gets closer. 
In contrast, when agents' higher-order beliefs disagree, the holder and the agent with 
the highest first-order belief need not be the same anymore. This generates richer trading 
patterns. Because of the diverse patterns of volume it creates, disagreement at higher­
order levels makes models of speculation interesting in their own right. This should 
underscore the pertinence of any assumption that keeps the richness of the hierarchy 
of beliefs intact yet enhances the model's tractability. Our assumption that investors a 
priori consider themselves Lo be just average. delivers this. 
Unfortunately, the full .model with higher-order disagreement cannot be solved an­
alytically. We characterize its properties using sirnulations on the basis of numerical 
integration . Because of the simplicity of their trading implications (the holder and agent 
with highest first-order beliefs are identical), however, models with agreeing higher-order 
beliefs are analytically tractable and we present some features of such models first. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section , we present the model. In 
Sections 3 and '1, we examine the two cases where the distribution of beliefs is common 
knowledge and where the agents agree after observing each other's first-order belief. In 
Section 5 we report the results of simulations, in order to assess the impact of higher-order 
disagreement on prices and volume. Finally. Section 6 offers some concluding comments. 
The proofs are in the Appendix. 
2 The Model 
2.1 Assumptions 
Consider a market for one risky asset with random payoff X at time T + 1. At times
t = 1, . . .  T, a new agent enters the market and bids to buy the asset from the agent who 
holds it. The latter has the choice between selling a.t that price or keeping the asset. 
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If she keeps it, she may sell the asset later to another a.gent or keep it until the end, 
and receive X. There is only one unit of the asset and short sales a.re not allowed. For 
simplicity there is no discounting and a.gents a.re risk neutral. Also for simplicity the 
new a.gents entering the markets a.re assumed to bid their reservation value. The latter 
reflects their own perception of the value of the final cash flow and the value of the option 
to resell the asset. 
Agents have different beliefs a.bout the final payoff X.2 Agent t, who enters the market
a.t time t, expects the asset to pay off µ1 a.t time T + 1. This is hereafter referred to a.s
the a.gent's first-order belief. First-order beliefs a.re i.i.d draws from a. distribution with 
expectation (}*. This means that the average first-order belief in the economy is O*: 
where Ee· (. ) denotes that the expectation is taken given the knowledge of the parameter
I}*. For simplicity, assume ()* io the only parameter of the distribution of first-order 
beliefs. 
Except for the arrival of new agents with cli rferent beliefs, there is no information 
revelation in the market. Om model is not an a.symmetric-information rational expec­
tations model. The different first-order beliefs a.re not signals a.bout the fundamental 
value of the asset. On observing the beliefs of the other a.gents, a.gent i does not alter his 
first-order beliefs. Agents agree to disagree. 
All a.gents know that there a.re differences in beliefs. The fact that the first-order
beliefs a.re i.i.d draws from a. given distribution, characterized by a. para.meter B, is com­
mon knowledge. But the a.gents do not know the exact value of IJ, IJ*. They have priors 
a.bout it, in the form of a. distribution over fJ. The priors differ a.cross a.gents. vVhen they 
observe additional information, all agents update according to Ba.yes' law. We assume 
that the a.gent who enters the market at time t has observed the sequence of offers up to 
time t. She uses this information to learn about e.
\,I/hen the holder of the asset meets a.n a.gent with a. higher fundamental valuation 
(first-order belief) , he ma.y choose to keep the asset instead of selling. He will do so
knowing that he may be able to sell in the future when meeting new agents. Because 
of these future trading opportunities, the agent. values the asset beyond his first-order 
belief. This increrne.nta.l value wiU be referred to as t.h<e resale option value. Speculation 
in the sense of Hanison and Kreps [1978] arises: even if convinced that the asset has a. 
low fundamental value, a.n agent may want to buy the asset at a high price, anticipating 
a. sale a.t a.n even higher price.
2Equivalently1 \Ve could interpret the differences bet\veen a.gents as differences in private value. Ilow� 
cver1 in financial n1arl�ets, differences in beliefs seen1 a. inore re!e'.'ant feature. 
In order to determine the resale option value, agents must assess the price at which 
future agents may be willing to buy the asset. Consider the holder of the asset at time t. 
He values the option to resell a lot if he expects the next agents to have high first-order 
beliefs. So, to compute the value of the asset, the agent must ha.ve beliefs about the first­
order beliefs of the other agents, i.e., second-order beliefs. The agent a1so anticipates 
that, in  addition to the fundamental value they assign to the asset, subsequent a.gents 
will value the resale option a.s well. Their valuation of the resale option will, in turn, 
depend on their second-order beliefs. Hence, agent t must have beliefs about the second­
order beliefs of the next agents, i.e., third-order beliefs. Iterating the argument we find 
that fourth, fifth, and even infinite-order beliefs must be considered. This is an infinite 
regress. 
In order to solve the infinite regress, we make the following assumption. Ea.ch a.gent 
a priori believes he has an average belief, i.e., he thinks that, on average, other agents 
have the same first-order belief as he does: 
\;/ j : E'·(,1 ) - 1,.I T') /•, 
where E;(.) denotes the expectation operator, from the point of view of a.gent i, i.e., using
his priors. The fact that each a.gent a priori thinks he is average is common knowledge. 
This assumption solves the infinite regress problem because it implies that the a priori 
nth-order belief of agent i is his first-order belief. For example, in the case of second-order 
beliefs: 
E;(EJ(X)) = E;(flJ) = 11;. 
In the case of third-order beliefs, the same simplification applies: 
The generalization to nth-order beliefs is straightforward. Note that the assumption also 
implies that, on average, agents correctly estimate the beliefs of others: 
Consequently, the model has the flavor of a standard rational expectations model, but 
only on average.
2.2 Decisions 
At time t, a new a.gent i .. with first-order belief 11.;, enters the market. She bids to 
buy the asset a.t her reservation value: r;, where the subscript i denotes the identity of 
tl1e age.nt a.11cl tl1e st1perscript t denotes the point in tirne. Tl1e current holder sells the 
asset if rJ exceeds his own reservation value. The decision process of the agents and the 
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determination of the reservation values can be most clearly described in a simple two­
period case. At times t = 0, l and 2 new agents enter the market, a.nd the asset pays off
X at time T + 1 = :3. The different trading sequences, corresponding to trades at times
1 and 2 are represented in the tree in Figure 1. 
The reservation values a.re determined by backward induction. 
§ At time 2, agent 2 enters the market. Her reservation value for·the asset ·equals
her first-order belief about X, p2. 3 Agent 2 buys the asset from the current holder
if the first-order belief of the latter is lower than p2• If agent 1 had bought the
asset from agent 0 at time l, a.gent 2 buys the asset at time 2 whenever p2 > p1.
If a.gent 0 ha.cl preferred to keep the asset at time 1, agent 2 buys the asset at time
2 whenever 1'2 > po.
§ At time 1, a.gent 1 knows that he can either sell the asset a.t time 2 ,  a.nd obtain p2,
or keep it and obtain 1i1 . So, his time-] reservation value, and, hence, his offer, is:
where E;'(.) is the expectation operator from the point of view of agent i at time 
t (formed using the priors of agent 'i, updated to time t) .  Similarly, the time-1 
reservatio11 value of agent 0 equals: 
Agent 0 sells the asset whenever r; > r),. 
§ At time 0, anticipating choices at later times, a.gent 0 has reservation value:
rg Eg(ma.x[r6, r;J)
Eg(max[E6(max[1io, /t2] ) , Ei(max[v1 , /t2])]). 
In general, when the time horizon is T E N, the formula for the reservation price of 
agent i a.t time t is: 
rl = Ef (max[rl+l, r;ti J ) . 
It is somewhat difficult to write explicitly. However it retains the same structure as in 
the two-period example, i.e., expectations over..rnaxima. of e.,'(pectations over maxima ... : 
rl = El(ma.x[Ef+l(max[ . . .  ] ) , Eiti(max[ ... ]]). 
1'his expressio11 is co111.plex, beca.11se (1) expectations are taken over maxi1na (11011-linear
functions) of random variables, and because (ii) the C'Xpectation operators differ not only 
3Ren1en1ber that agents \vill not. learn about. .\. IIence the first-order belief of agent 2 about X is
unaffected by the off(�rs of the previous agents. 
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in terms of information sets but also to the extent tha.t the agents have different prior 
beliefs. Because of the latter, the law of iterated expectations cannot be applied. In the 
next section we analyze a case where simplifications are possible. 
To conch1de this section, we analyze the behavior of the best offer in the market at 
time t (denoted b,) . lt is defined as the rnaxirnum of the reservation values of the holder 
of the asset and the new agent who enters the market at time t: 
I [ t t l Ji = i11ax ·1·t, r(t-l)* ,
where ( t - 1 )* denotes the index of the a.gent who holds the asset a.t the encl of the t - 1st 
trading round, and consequently holds the asset at the beginning of the tth round. By 
definition, b, is the reservation value of the agent who holds the asset at the end of the 
tth round. This agent expects to be able to sell the asset at time t + 1 a.t the reservation 
value of the new entra.nt riti or to keep the asset at his own reservation value. The
maximum of the two is the best offer in the market at time t + l, bt+l· Since the agents 
a.re risk-neutral, one can state the following lemma. 
Lernma 1 From the point of view o.f the a.gent who holds the asset, the best offer in the 
market is a martingale: 
The martingale property is simply a rationa.lity condition, very much in the spirit of the 
ea.rly results of Sarnuelson [1965]. Note however that. the martingale result only holds
from the perspective of the holder of the asset. Under other beliefs, the best offer may 
not be a. rnartinga1e. If()' is common knowledge. however, the ma.rtinga.le property also 
holds under the 'true' probability measure. \Ve sLatf' this as a. corollary. 
Corollary 1 rt'()* is common knowledge,
Eo.(b,+i) = b,. 
3 Analytical Results
Assume that any two a.gents a.gree over the distribution of first-order beliefs in the econ­
omy after sharing their information sets. vVe shall refer to this as Assumption A. It 
means that: 
(The next section will provide a parametrization were this is true. ) 
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3.1 Reservation Values 
Reservation values are given in the next proposition. 
Proposition 1 Under Assumption A, the reservation value for agent i at time t equals: 
ri = Ef(ma.x[µ;, fl1+1 ·. f'1+2 , . . .  flT]), 
for all t < T, i :':'. t .
(All proofs a.re in  the Appendix.) From Proposition 1 ,  i t  follows that the speculative 
component of the value of the asset, i.e . . the cli rference between the reservation and 
fu11da1nenta.l values, is nonnegative: 
rl - f'i = Ef rnax[f1;, /1t+2, ···PT] - ft; :C: 0.
In the rational expectations literature, this speculative component is referred to as the 
'bubble' (see Tirole [1982]). 
Proposition 1 also implies that reservation values are increasing 111 the first-order 
beliefs. \Ve state this as a corollary. 
Corollary 2 Under Asswnption A. 
The intuition of the corollary is the following. Under assumption A,  and after observing 
ea.ch other's first-order beliefs, agents have the same higher-order beliefs. Hence, they 
have the same perception of the resale option value and their reservation values differ 
only because their first-order beliefs do not agree. As a result of Corollary 2, tra.de occurs 
only when the newly arrived agent has a. higher first-order belief than the current holder 
of the asset. This implies that, a.t time l, Lhe current holder of the asset is the a.gent with 
the highest first-order belief since time 0. 
Reservation prices can be more precisely a.na.lyzed by computing explicitly the expec­
tation in Proposition l. 'vVe state the result as a corollary. 
Corollary 3 Under As.s1lmpt-ion A, the reservation value of agent i at time t equals: 
ri = ''i + / ( f'° Pe (ma.x[111+1, . .  .flT] > s)ds)f,(B)dB,./e .!µ, 
where the probability Fe (ma.x[µ1+1 ,  ···P.T] > s) is conditwnal on IJ, and f1 ( . )  is the density 
of(}, given lhe sequence /lo, .. . flt for any agent 0 :':'. i <:: t.
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Corollary :3 shows explicitly tha.t the reservation value is the sum of the fundamental and
option or speculative values. 
Corollary 3 can be used to characterize the process of the reservation values further. 
Corollary 4 Under Assumption A. ri is a submartingale -under agent i's beliefs, z.e., 
r' > E'(r'+') i - .J/, l • 
This result reflects the decrease in the speculative value of the asset as the horizon 
gets closer. The decline is due to the loss of resale opportunities and the decrease in 
uncertainty about () as the number of draws of first-order beliefs increases. Corollary 4 
does not contradict Lemma 1 (which stated that the best offer is a martingale from the
point of view of the holder). In the case of Lemma 1,  the decrease in the option value is 
offset by the fact that the new entrant might have higher beliefs than the current holder, 
so that the latter would sell and earn capital gains. 
When ()* is common knowledge, the expression for the reservation value can be sim­
plified further. 
Corollary 5 ff(}* is known, the reservation uaine of agen/; i at time t is: 
r; = /l; +j"00(Pe•(max[1'1+1 ... ·/lT] > s)d.s. 
'" 
In this case, the impact of /li on the reservation value can be easily analyzed. An increase 
in /li implies an increase in the fundamental value of the asset for the agent. But it also 
implies a decrease in the speculative value oft.he asset, i.e., in: 
!'" Pe·(nrnx[/lt+l· .. l'T] > .s)d.s. 
' /.11 
If /li is large, the a.gent does not expect Lo find a.not.her agent with a higher first-order 
belief, hence the a.gent does not expect. to sell. \\.'hen o· is unknown, the impact of 
/li on the speculative component is more ambiguous. An incre,a.se,in Jli may imply an 
increase in the belief that somebody with a higher first-order belief will be met, but the 
higher-order beliefs of the latter ha,ve to be taken into account as well.
As the number of draws of first-order beliefs increases, higher-order beliefs become 
more precise. In the limit, O' is perfectly known and the reservation values are as given in 
the Corollary 5. Note tha.t even in this case, the value of the asset is above its fundamental 
value. There continues to be speculation when I)* is known. 
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3.2 The Best Offer in the Market 
Using Proposition 1 and Corollary 2, the following obtains. 
Proposition 2 Under Assu.mplion A, the bes/ olj'cr in the market at time t (b,) equ.als: 
where i is any integer between 0 and t. 
Proposition 2 reflects the rational expectation by the market that the asset will be owned 
by the agent with the maximum first-order belief. Since the agents are risk neutral and 
learning, their reservation value for the asset is equa.l to their conditional expectation of 
this maximum. 
From Proposition 2, the best offer in the market at time t can be obtained analytically. 
We state this as a corollary. 
Corollary 6 Under Assumption A, the best o,O'er in the market at time t equals: 
§ the probability P8(max[l't+1 , . .. /tr]> s) is conditional one,
§ f,(.) is the density of e, given !he sequence /lo, .. .  /lt for any agent 0 ::::: i::::: t, 
§ 11; = max[p.o, .... , /lt].
4 A Parametric Example 
Vie now propose.a,.d-istribution that .. fit.s Assumption A. This . .ena.bles.us to analyze more 
explicitly (i) the learning process, (ii) the specula.tive component of prices and (iii) the 
econometric implications of our analysis for Lhe evolution of prices a.ncl volume. 
Assume tha,t the first-order beliefs, 11;, a.re i.i.d. draws from an exponential distribu­
tion with parameter IJ. This implies that:
1 1  
Assume further that the priors of agent i about (} are inverse gamma. The inverse gamma 
distribution depends on two parameters, which we denote ai and /3;. We will use the 
shorthand notation IG(ai, (I;) for the distribution. Its mean equals ((ai - l)/)i)-1 and its
variance (the inverse of the precision) ((a;-1)2(a;-2)/32)-1. We set: (ni,/3i) = (2,1/µi)· 
In that case, agents' higher-order beliefs have rneans: 
l 
E;(O) = (ai - 1)/1; = /t;, 
and, hence, 
E;(!';) = Ei(Ee(!';)) = Ei(B) = /t;. 
That is, a priori, agents think they have average first order beliefs, as required. 
The sequence of offers rg, ... r; can be inverted to obtain the sequence of first-order 
beliefs: /to, · · · Pt · The agents use this information to update their higher-order beliefs. 
In the exponentia.l-invcrse garnrna case, the posterior based on a sample of µ0, ... µ, is 
IG(2 + t, O::L0 /fi)-1 ). Notice that the posteriors always agree. In particular, for all
i � t, 
"' I'.F' ( IJ) = L.,i=O ' J' t + 1 ,
i.e., the posterior expectation of 0 is simply the empirical average of the first-order beliefs.
As the number of draws in creases. the expectation of I} converges to (}*. 
vVhen (a;,/)i) = (2, l//t; ) , the results of the previous section can be made more 
explicit. For exa.rnple. tbe reservation value of a.gent. i at time t can be ea.sily computed 
from Proposition 1. 
Corollary 7 If first-order beliefs are e:rponent.ia.! and higher-order beliefs inverse gamma 
with parameters (2, l/lt;) , agent i's time-l reservation value equals: 
T-t . (-1).i+l , � c··1 r; = /t,; + L.. 'r-t . 
:i=l J 
flt + j /li '1 + . /Ii 1-(t+2)
t + l l J Tit 
, 
I - - "'' w 1ere l't = LJ=D /t.;.
\i\fhen {)* is co111111011 kno\vledge, 1.hc expression can be si111plified further, 
Corollary 8 ff.first-order beliefs are e:t:ponentia.l with parnm.eier 8* and this is common 
knowledge, the reservation value of agent: i at tim.e t is 
T-t D' 
� . ·+1 v :!!:i ri = /li + / � C'�_,(-1}7 -::-e-J e . 
.i=l J 
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The formulae for the best offers in the market are similar, except that 1i; ( = ma.x[µ0, . .  µ,]) 
must be substituted for /l;. 
5 Simulation Results
Until now, we have been looking at cases where agents' higher-order beliefs are correct or 
where they agree aJter one observation (Assumption A). Because it was easy to determine 
who would hold the asset at any moment ( Corollary 2), analytical solutions could be 
obtained. But the aim of the paper is to understand the consequences of full disagreement 
(when beliefs agree only asymptotically) for prices and volume in  financial markets. 
Because the identity of the holder becomes ambiguous, the model is intractable and 
prices and volume can only be characterized through simulations based on numerical 
calculations of reservation values. Using the same numerical approximation, we also 
simulated the models where a.gents' higher-order beliefs were correct and where higher­
order beliefs agreed after one observation, in order to induce the same numerical error 
and make the results compa.rable across models. The ava.ila.bility of analytical solutions, 
moreover, allowed us to verify that the rrnrncrical enor was small.4 
5.1 Description of the Simulations 
We assume that the first-order beliefs are i . i .d .  exponential with mean O*. When agents' 
higher-order beliefs agree aft.er one observation, we use the same specification as in the 
previous section. In the third version of the model, where agents' higher-order beliefs 
agree only asymptotically, we set the prior of a.gent i to be inverted gamma with param­
eters O'.i = µi + 1 and /); = l/ p}. vVith this specification, our assumption that agent i
a priori perceives other agents' beliefs to be hers on average, continues to be satisfied. 
Also, reservation vaiues a.re still invertible in the first-order belief, so that the holder 
can correctly infer the bidder's beliefs hierarchy (we h ave only been able to verify this 
invertibility numerically). 
Nevertheless, agents who assign a fundamentaI value below one to the asset (µi :C:: 1) 
have zero-precision higher-order beliefs. Since the level of precision of the higher-order 
beliefs and the vaiue of the resale option are inversely related, there is a trade-off between 
fundamental value and resale value, to tl1e extent that some agents with low first-order 
beliefs may initially assign a higher total vaiue to holding the asset than agents with 
higher first-order beliefs within a certain range. 
4The nu1nerical error 'vas very sn1a.ll in the range of the distribution of beliefs \vi th 111ost of the (prob­
ability) 1na.ss, but substantial close to the edges i1nposecl in the nu1nerical approxin1ation; in particular) 
agents "\vith high first-order beliefs uncleresti111a.t.ed the resale option, because the distribution of beliefs 
is necessarily truncated in the n11n1f:'rical approxin1a.t.ion. 
It may seem that this revers1011 in reservation values destroys invertibility. For the 
holder to correctly infer the beliefs of the bidder, however, reservation values should be 
invertible when evaluated using the history of first-order beliefs including those of the 
holder, but exduding those of the bidder. In contrast, when the holder contemplates 
the choice of selling the asset to the bidder, she does not consider her own first-order 
beliefs as part of the history from which she learns the distribution of beliefs, and, hence, 
determines her reservation value. Yet , she does include the first-order beliefs of the 
bidder. This difference in information sets makes invertibility compatible•with higher 
valuation by speculators with lower first-order beliefs. 
Our specification of the higher-order beliefs is admittedly subtle, but simplifies the 
calculations substantially. It should be obvious that we could have generalized, at the cost 
of loosing the invertibility of the reservation values in the first-order beliefs. Updating 
would still be possible, but much more complex. Volume and volatility patterns, though, 
would potentially be richer. 
The simulations were carried out in several steps. 
1 .  The number of periods T was set equal to 1 0 . 
2. Three possible values of 0' where used, namely, 0.6 ,  0 .8  and 1 .0 .
3 .  Reservation values were ca.lcnlatecl using immerica1 integration with a mesh equal 
to 0 .l. 
4. We generated 103 sample paths of J.' + 1 draws of first-order beliefs, discretized over
intervals of size 0. 1 (-i.e. ,  matching the mesh in the numerical calculations) .
5. At each point in time. and for each sample path, we computed the reservation
value of the holder of the asset, and that of the a.gent who entered the market, thus
determining whether there was a trade and at. what price.
6. For each trading round, we computed sample averages and standard deviations
over the 1 03 sample paths of the following variables: the beliefs of the holder, the
trading volume, the best offer in the market, and the transaction price5.
5.2 The Resuits 
5.2.1 Trading Volume 
Figures 2 and ;3 depict. the changes in the first-order beliefs of the bolder and the trading 
volume, respectively, a.s a function of the trading round. Trading volume gradually dies 
5'rransaction prices are defined in the sa1ne "'a.y as on the ISSlVI tape. Let P7 denote the transaction 
price at tin1e t. Tf there is a t.racle, pf= bt. Other1Yisc. PT= p7_1. 
14 
out as time passes. 'vVhen IJ* is common knowledge or when higher-order beliefs agree 
after one observation, the holder always has the highest first-order beliefs (of all the 
agents that have entered the market; Corollary 2 states this for the case when higher­
order beliefs agree after one observation). Consequently, the first-order belief of the holder 
cannot decrease over time, but increases become less likely as time passes (see Figure 2). 
Increases translate into trades, and, hence, volume gradually decreases (Figure 3). 
In the third case, this phenomenon is mitigated. As conjectured above,-some -agents 
with low fundamental valuation, but, imprecise higher-order beliefs (i.e., high resale 
option valuation) pass on trades they would never let go in the first two cases. They 
even buy from agents with higher fundamental valuation, in the hope of selling later. 
When the horizon nears and if they have not been able to sell earlier, they unload the 
asset in the market (remember that they do not attach a high fundamental value to 
the asset). This is most clearly reflected in Figure 2, where the average change in the 
first-order beliefs of the holder is much lower in early trading rounds than in the first 
two cases, but much higher later on. The activity of the agents with low first-order 
beliefs maintains volume, albeit without offsetting its secular decline. This is depicted in 
Figure :3. 
5.2.2 The Best Offer in the Market 
As ca.n be seen in Figme '1, when beliefs agree only a,symptotica1ly, the average change 
in the best offer is positive at the beginning .. then it graclua1ly declines until it becomes 
negative, Eventually it reverts slowly back to 0. 'vVhat we observe is: 
One might conclude that agents '  valuations are biased, that they should realize this (after 
all, they can perform the simulations that we die!), and revise their bids accordingly. 
However, this line of reasoning is not correct. Agents must not look at the behavior of 
the best offer in the same way as we do in the simulations. At time t, agents do not know 
()*yet. Agents may want to estimate Ee.(b1+1)  using their own information. That is, at
time t, agent. i could compute: Ei(Ee(b1+1 )). But performing this computation does not
make sense for them. Indeed, when taking the expectation Eo(b1+1 ) ,  agents would throw
away valuable information about the first t draws of 11.1• Instead, what agents compute is:
Ef[E0(bt+1lµ0, . . .  µ1)] . Hence, to determine if the oner at time tis over- or under-valued,
agent i compares E![Eo(b1lpo, .. .ft1 )] with E![Eo(h1+1 I/to , . . .  p1)] .  The first term equals b, 
and the second one Ef(li,+1) .  Rationality (and risk neutrality) implies that the two terms
should be equal (see Lem ma l). 
5.2.3 Transaction Price Changes 
Figure 5 displays the average change in the transaction price as a function of the trading 
round. In light of onr discussion about the best offer in the ma.rket , the predictability of 
transaction prices should not come as a surprise. vVe should, however, draw the reader's 
attention to the behavior of the transaction price when higher-order beliefs are correct: 
on average, its change is (significantly) positive and constant. This pattern is reminiscent 
of the behavior of risk premia in simple rationa.l expectations moclel.s. As.a matter of fact, 
an econornetrician who ignores the absence of information flow about the asset's payoff 
and who focuses on the behavior of the transaction price would (incorrectly) infer that 
he is in a standard rational expectations economy. This impression will be reinforced 
when he contemplates Figure 7 (to be discussed later), where it is documented that 
volume cannot be used to predict transaction prices. If he were to focus on bid prices, 
he would find substantial evidence of a martingale (Figure 4), consistent with standard
noisy rational expectations models of the micro.structure of a financial market. 
5.2.4 Volatility 
In our model, there is no release of J'unda.rnental information about the likely payoff 
on the asset. In spite of this, there is vohrnre and volatility. The disagreement among 
traders creates a resale option, whose value changes over time. Figure 6 illustrates this. 
Notice the dramatic increase in volatility when there is tmcertainty a.bout the distribution 
of beliefs. However, a.s lea.ming about the distribution of beliefs progresses, volatility 
declines. 
5.2.5 The Relation Between Volume and Volatility 
Figure 7 documents that. . when there is ur1ccrta.inty about the distribution of first-order 
beliefs, tra.ding volume (or rather the absence of it) can be used to predict futnre price 
changes . The intuition behind this preclicta.bi lity is simple: high volume (hectic trading) 
is good news about the distribution of first-order beliefs; the holder is continuously sur­
prised by the heavy buying activity and revises her reservation value (a lower boundary 
to the transaction price in the subsequent trading round, if there is a trade) upward. 
Conversely, when buyers stay out of the market, the holder necessarily revises clown her 
beliefs a.bout the resale potential of the asset. When there is a transaction, it will be at 
a substantially discounted price. 
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5.3 Simulation Errors 
Because analytical expressions for the reservation va1ues are unavailable when agents' 
higher-order beliefs agree only asymptotically, numerical integration using a finite mesh 
is used, and the sample paths of the first-order beliefs have to be correspondingly dis­
cretized. \Nhile altering the size of the mesh did not affect the results qualitatively, one 
specific pattern did emerge. At this moment we a.re not sure whether this is evidence
of a more general property about smoothness of price changes, or a n1ere ea1·tefact of the
specific distributional assumptions. 
As we increased the mesh from 0 . 1  to 0.2, we noticed a more pronounced volume and
volatility rebound in later trading rounds for the case where higher-order beliefs converge 
only asymptotica1ly. This effect was clearest when 0' = 0.6. Figure S provides the charts 
that document this. The late increase in volume and volatility can be attributed to the 
lower initial change in first-order beliefs of the holder (actually, negative) reported in 
the top panel of Figure 8. In other words, tlie increase in the mesh lowers the average 
first-order belief of the holder in early trading rounds, lea.cling to a more dramatic sell-off 
in later periods as investors gradua]ly lcan1 about the true distribution of beliefs and run 
out of resale opportunities. 
One could wonder whether it is a general property that if the distribution of beliefs 
is continuous, price changes are smooth and volume more spread out, whereas, if beliefs 
are discrete, price decreases (as opposed t.o increases) a.re sudden and volume uneven. 
Our experience with altering the mesh of the discretization in the simulations indicates 
that this conjecture rna.y be correct. 
6 Conclusion
Perhaps the empirically most relevant aspect of models of financial markets with spec­
ulating a.gents is that they predict volume and volatility in the absence of information 
about the fundamental value of the asset. As Roll has stressed on several occasions (see, 
e.g., Roll [ 1984], [ 1989]), this is the single most. puzzling feature of fina.ncial ma.rkets that
cannot be explained in terms of standard asset pricing models. This paper demonstrated 
that speculation generates substantial volatility and volume without. 'funda.ment.al infor-
1natio11.' Pt·,ice- a:n-d -tFa.de -p,a.tterns are j)otent:ially- 'l'i-chest '\vhen {;-_bere-is-�:Jisa,gree1nent at 
higher-order levels. 
Our model still presents some weaknesses. To single out the most disturbing one: it 
is assumed that the holder can somehow obtain truthful revela.tion of the bidder's beliefs 
without specifying the mechanism that will enable this. There is no strategic interaction. 
Om intuition is that the availability of alternatives for the holder would force bidders not. 
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to manipulate. It may be that further research along the lines of Green [1991 J will prove 
this intuition to be correct. Nevertheless, given the presence of large players in actual 
financial markets, the potential to manipulate beliefs is interesting in its own right and 
deserves to be looked at more closely. 
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Figure 1: Event Tree With Two Trading Rounds (T=Z) 
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Figure Z: Average Change in First-Order Beliefs of Holder as a Function of the 
Trading Round, for e* � 0.6 (Top), B* � 0.8 (Middle) and e* � 1.0 (Bottom) 
Note: Full line depicts results when higher-order beliefs agree only 
asymptotlcal ly; long dashes depict results when higher-order beliefs agree 
after one observation; short dashes depict results when higher-order beliefs 
agree and are correct. The averages are based on 103 simulations. 
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Fi.gure 3: Average Volume as a Function of the Trading Round, for e* 0.6 
(Top), 8* � 0.8 (Middle) and e* � 1.0 (Bottom) 
Note: Full Hne depicts results when higher-order beliefs agree only 
asymptotically; long dashes depict results when higher-order beliefs agree 
after one observation; short dashes de pi.ct results when hi.gher-order bel i.efs 
agree and are correct. The averages are based on 103 simulations. 
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Figure 4: Average Change 1n Best Offer as a Function of the Trading Round, for 
8* = 0.6 (Top), e* = 0.8 (Middle) and e* = 1.0 (Bottom) 
Note: Full line depicts results when higher-order beliefs agree only 
asymptotically; long dashes depict results when higher-order beliefs agree 
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agree and are correct. The averages are based on 103 simulations. 
22 
0 . 3  
0 . 2 5  
0 . 2  
0 . 1 5
0. 1 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
�­
/' -- -� 0. 0� - - - - - - - - - - :-: - � � -
0.4 
0 . 3  
0 . 2  
0 .  1 
0 2 
\ 
\ 
\ 
---s 
""---------.__\ '-, " 
------ '"' 
4 
-- ... ... - - _.. - - - '-.::--:; - .::o.-...-
0 
0 2 4 
\ 
0.4 
\ 
0 . 3  � 
0 . 2  
·
"
�
� 
6 3 
-
- ' ...::....:.
_. :::....::...- - -- -
� 
6 3 
· : [- - - - - - - -� l 
0 2 4 6 3 
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Note: Full line depicts results when higher-order beliefs agree only 
asymptotically ; long dashes depict results when htgher-o rder bel tefs agree 
after one observation ; short dashes depict results when higher-order beliefs 
agree and are cor rect. The averages are based on 103 simulations. 
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Tradi.ng Round, for 8* = 0.6 (Top) , B* = 0 . 8  (Mi.ddle) and B* = 1.0 (Bottom) 
Note : Full l i . ne depi.cts results when hi.gher-order beli.efs agree only 
asymptotically; long dashes depict results when hi.gher-order bel i.efs agree 
after one observati.on; short dashes de pi.ct results when hi.gher-order bel i.efs 
agree and are correct. The averages are based on 103 si.mulati.ons. 
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after one observation; short dashes depict results when higher-order beliefs 
agree and are correct. The averages are based on 103 si.mulati.ons. 
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Figure 8 :  Average Change in First-Order Beliefs o f  Holder (Top), Average 
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after one observation; short dashes depict results when higher-order beliefs 
agree and are correct. The averages are based on 103 simulations. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 :  
The proof i s  by induction. 
At time T - 1 ,  the reservation value of agent i is Ef-1 (max[µ;, µr ]). Hence, at that time
the property holds. Assume that at t + l the property holds, i.e., the reservation value 
of a.gent i i s :  
. .  t+ l _ Et+ 1 ( 11 °x[  · I ] ) 1 i - ·i I ..-. ... P' 1 1  /lt+2·  . . . .  ly .
We now show tha.t the property bolds at time l .  At time l + l, the agent can keep the 
a.sset, a.ncl obtain his reservation value. A lternativcly, he can sell the asset to agent t + l 
a.t the reservation value of the latteL which equals: 
J+i - E'+l ( ·[ ]) 1 t+I - 1.+1 111a.X flt+1 � flt+2 • · · ·PT .
From Assumption A, 
If µ; < µt+1 , agent i sells the asset ancl obtains: 
If instead µ; > l't+r ,  agent i keeps the asset and obtains: 
So, in both ca.ses he obtains: 
At time t ,  a.gent i anticipates this .  so his reservation value for the asset equals: 
.t - E'[E'+ 1 (  · 1 ·1"[ . 
· 
])] 'l i  - - -'i -'i _ ll ( . ,-, P·1 1 flt+l � · · ·f"T .
Since both expectation operators are ta.ken from the perspective of a.gent i ,  we can apply 
the law of i terated expectations. Hence the reservation value of the asset for a.gent i at 
time t i s :  
ri = E! (max[1i;, /l1+1 , . . . ftT]). 
D 
Proof of Corollary 2 :  
ri > rj ¢} E) (max[11 ;, f'1+2· . . . p.r] ) > E;(max[fl; , /'1+2 , . .  . ftr] ) .
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However, under Assumption A ,  EJ ( . )  = Ej ( . ) .  Hence, 
So, 
D 
rf > r; B E[(max[fii , /11+2 , . . . /ty] ) > Ei (nrnx[1i1 , /'1+2, . . .  /lT] ) . 
t - t ri > "'i B /l· i > /1-.i · 
Proof of Corollary 3 :  
From Proposition 1 ,  
This can be rewritten: 
fµ'7'(s - 11i)dPo (ma.x[11.,+1 , . . .  pT] < s )  can be rewritten: 
Now: 
and 
("" sdPe (max[11.t+1 , . .  . JlT] < s )  - /l; j"x· dPo ( max[1'1+1 , . . .  /l·T] < s ) .J/£1 • P i  
100 dPo(max[1'1+1 ,  . . .  /lT] < s ) = 1 - Po (max[111+1 , . . .  /LT] < p; ) ,  
,,, 
Integrating by parts, one obtains: 
[-s ( 1 - Po( max[1'1+1 ,  . . .  /tT] < s ) )  ]:;'. + ;·"' ( 1 - Po ( rnax[1'·1+ 1 ,  . .  ·PT] < s )ds .
• ji., 
Simplifying, 
D 
r·) = /t; + /' /"x ( l  - P9 (rna.x[111+1 . . . .  /tr] < s) ds f, (O)dlJ .}E) },,.1 
Proof of Corollary 4 :  
From Corollary :3:
where 
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§ iJ>(ft; , O , t )  = f,'::' Pe(max[ftt+1 ,  . .  .ftr] > s)ds. 
(Note that iJ> is non--increasing in its th ird argument. )
§ E.I is taken over e .
Consequently: 
r' > E' (r'+1 ) ¢;, E'iJ>(11 . . 0. t) > E'(Et+1 (iJ>(1i - 0. t) ) ) .i - t t 'l ' l ; I - ( / 1 )  J 
This holds because 
i!>(t.'' ' e, t ) .:::: <J>(p.;. o, t + 1 ) .  
D 
Proof of Corollary 5: 
Follows immediately from Corollary :3. 
D 
Proof of Proposition 2 :  
Let i be the agent wbo holds th" asset aJter the I t h  round of tra.cle. Hence, 
/li = max[1io, . .  .flt].
Combining this with Proposition 1,  the proposition obtains. 
D 
Proof of Corollary 6 :  
Combine Proposition 2 with Corollary :J.
D 
Proof of Corollary 7: 
From Corollary :3, the reservation value of agent i at time t is: 
r-i = ft; + l ( Jl=· Po(rnax[/'t+I• . .. /tT] > s)ds)f, ((})dlJ. )(0 �l-, 
m , • 1 • i • · ,  1 r· . 1 r,x._; ri i r l � \ l , 1 1-o co1npl1te t111s tT1ore exp11c1t1y, \VE' 11rsr, analyze JPi ro l ill<-l.Xl/"t+1 , · · · llTJ ..> SJa.S,  i:.r1e11 we
integrate over I) .  
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Analyze J;: Pe (max[p1+1 ,  · · ·l'T] > s )ds first. The probability that one exponential vari­
able with parameter e is smaller than s equals:
The probability that T - t exponential variables are smaller than s equals:
T-t 
[1 - e-s/Bf-t = L C}_, (- l )je-js/O ,
J=O 
or 
T-t 
1 + L C}_, (-J ) ie-js/B .
j::::] 
So, the probability that T - i exponential variables a.re larger tha.n s equals: 
T-t 
Pe (max[1lt+J · · · ·l'T] > s) = ,L C}_,( - !Y+I e-.is/o .
.1=1 
We now integrate this over s E [/t i ,  oo]. 
This can be rewri tt.en: 
Integrate over 0: 
or 
T-1 
L Cj-_, ( - l )J+l (O/j )e-i11, /0 _
.i=l 
T-t 
ri = !'i +  1 _L C}_,( -l )i+1 ( 0jj ) e-fr11°f, (O)diJ,
e .i=l 
T-t . 
r; = /Ii + L C�._1 ( - 1 )J+1 f.j l IJf-.i"11°.t; (O)dO.
j=l (:) 
Tl1e latter ,integral ca.n ·be-- -\Vri tten rBore-,ex1)licitl.y: 
where 
l 1 
. -1/(;3,B) 1ee-.i;1 ;/0 ( . t. . . I ( -1 -. ) ° ' )diJ,. e O (o:1 - l ) .  310 
t 
Pt = (L /ls )-1  '= (fit )-1 
s=O 
:30 
and 
o:, = t + 2 
are the parameters of the inverse gamma distribution (the posterior beliefs about () of 
the agents in the market at time t ) .  The integral can be rewritten: 
or 
The integra1 is the expectation of an inverse garnrna variable with parameters ( t+2, (j µ; + 
µ,J-1 ) ,  i.e.,
.i /1; + µ,
t + l  
Substituting this in the formula for the reservation value, the proposition obtains. 
D 
Proof of Corollary 8 :  Combine Proposition 2 with elements from the proof of 
Corollary 7 .  
D 
:3 J 
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